Where state aid is distorting competition and creating inefficiencies it should and can be (self-)regulated. The European system of external monitoring and disciplines that the countries within the European Union are agreeing to have imposed on themselves has proven to reduce state aid levels and thereby increase overall welfare. Other than those that stem from its WTO commitments, New Zealand has no such monitoring mechanisms or disciplines, yet does, as do many other countries, provide state aid in various forms across different sectors of the economy, including public services. It is therefore important to understand the rationales behind the provision of different types of state aid, as well as its potentially negative effects on welfare. The European experience can then function as a benchmark for New Zealand and other countries in the Asia-Pacific region when considering the design of state aid rules in the future.
The two main rationales cited for the provision of state aid are (1) reducing or eliminating market failure of some form, often asymmetric information, and (2) strengthening performance of the economy. For instance, state aid may reduce the inefficiencies associated with externalities. Think of labour market imperfections that may be reduced as state aid contributes to easing labour market transitions, facilitating restructuring, sharing adjustment costs or perhaps promoting job creation. Other examples are the provision of state aid to increase environmental quality or promote innovation. State aid may also ameliorate financial and other market failures that differently affect small and medium sized firms, or promote the development of peripheral regions and facilitate the survival of fundamentally sound firms.
To the extent that state aid has beneficial effects that outweigh the deadweight welfare loss associated with the taxation that is required to finance it, it is socially desirable. 2 However, it is not clear in many circumstances that state aid will, in fact, "solve" externality problems where these are intrinsic to economic activities. Where state aid gives certain firms or products favoured treatment to the detriment of other firms or products, it has the potential of seriously disrupting normal competitive forces. State aid initially aimed at "facilitating the survival of fundamentally sound firms" or "supporting small and medium sized firms" may, for example, turn into supporting inefficient firms as these firms become dependent on the financial assistance they receive. Perhaps more reason for concern, however, are the competition and efficiency (including investment) distortions that may result from state aid where it is part of countries' strategic trade policies. These effects are even more concerning if the policies that create them are the result of political pressure by special interest groups, which is likely to be a third explanation for the provision of state aid.
To deal with cases of state aid that distort competition between Member
States, the European Union has developed a state aid control mechanism reflected in Articles 87 and 88 of the European Treaty. 3 Thus far, state aid control does not exist in other regions in the world. However, in addition to greater insight in the effects on public/private competition within countries, a better understanding of the interface between state aid and strategic trade policy is of considerable importance in this age of increasing globalisation and international trade flows. Trade in services appear to be particularly supported by state aid, which makes a closer look at services trade and aid all the more important as service sectors are expanding in most countries. In order to evaluate state aid, we need to look at the different rationales for the provision of aid and evaluate on a case-by-case basis whether these are indeed welfare enhancing justifications. To the extent that they are not, governments may need to be subject to stricter regulation than the commitments made in World Trade Organisation (WTO)
Agreements.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 analyses the three rationales for the provision of state aid -market failure, intergovernmental competition, and political economy motives. Section 3 builds on this by examining the scope for state aid control and reviewing existing international rules and regulation. Section 4 pays special attention to trade and aid in services in Europe and New Zealand. Finally, Section 5 sums up the main findings and concludes on the rationales for state aid and the implications for international competition policy.
Rationales for State Aid
As indicated in the Introduction, there are three basic rationales for the provision of state aid. Two of them are often used by governments defending their provision of state aid: the market failure rationale and the intergovernmental competition rationale.
These are justified either to correct for market failure, mainly due to asymmetric information resulting in undersupply of certain goods or services, or to strengthen the economy in order to improve the country's competitive position in the international arena. A third rationale, state aid as the outcome of the political economy game, is less frequently argued, but lobbying efforts may well be as determining of provision of state aid as are market failure and intergovernmental competition. However, for each of these rationales, counter-arguments and critiques can be formulated that identify the potential risks and/or inefficiencies that can result from state aid even if its provision can be justified by one of the above reasons.
Market Failure Rationale

Different types of market failure
In most market economies, the generic economic justification for the granting of state aid is the existence of market failure. Economic theory tells us there are different types of market failure that require different types of corrective measures. The provision of state aid is typically found in markets characterised by externalities, asymmetric information, and/or public good features.
Economic theory defines externalities as the effects of the activity of one entity on the welfare of another in a way that is not transmitted by market prices. 4 The classic example is the effect of pollution by a large factory on the surrounding environment and its inhabitants. The presence of externalities has traditionally been one of the main arguments for the provision of public subsidies and other forms of state aid. In the case of pollution, for example, the objective of subsidies is to give the business sector financial incentives to cooperate in improving environmental quality.
Another example of an externality that is used to justify state aid is the existence of imperfections in the labour or financial markets resulting from asymmetric information. Because the private cost of labour or financial market adjustments (or the cost of creating environmentally-friendly production techniques) exceed the social cost, it is argued, these socially-desired adjustments are undersupplied. A similar reasoning is often applied to investments in R&D and innovation -because the private 4 Rosen (1995) .
benefits from R&D and innovation are smaller than the social benefits, most market systems are likely to lead to underinvestment in R&D, thereby justifying public support for innovation.
The above examples may all supply the justification of the granting of horizontal aid, that is state aid crossing sectoral and geographical boundaries.
However, market failure may also arise in certain industries, or in certain geographical areas only, in which case we speak of sectoral aid or regional aid respectively. Sectoral aid is mainly targeted to declining industries and firms in sectors that are newly exposed to market competition. The rationale for the first category is to spread the social costs of adjustment and enable reorganised firms to continue operations. Such aid, which may help to retrain workers that have been made redundant, facilitate restructuring, or preserve the sector entirely, is often justified on social or historical grounds, rather than arguments of economic efficiency, although these too have a role. Similarly, for sectoral aid to newly privatised firms, the aim can be to facilitate adjustment to a shift in market circumstances. Such aid can take various forms, including limiting competition. It is provided for various purposes that include shoring up the value of a state asset and meeting adjustment costs such as those associated with lay-offs.
Rationales for regional aid can be drawn from the new geographical economics literature. The main argument is that in the presence of congestion externalities and increasing returns to scale, the location decisions of private firms may be suboptimal from a social point of view; and that the state has sufficient knowledge and implementation skill to anticipate and correct this deficiency. 5 In other words, economic activity may be relatively concentrated in some areas and almost non-existent in others. Regional aid may be aimed at correcting such socially suboptimal outcomes. Martin and Valbonesi (1999) 
Policy failure
Intergovernmental Competition Rationale
The rationale
At least as important as the market failure rationale is what we will call the "intergovernmental competition rationale", also called the "other governments do it" rationale. In their paper on international competition in government export financing, Evans and Oye (2001) 
The critique
It is interesting to note that while individual governments continue to provide state aid in order to avoid decreasing economic growth and welfare, they are likely to be better off if they all reduced the amount of aid they provide. This is a classic example of the "prisoners' dilemma" drawn from game theory. The textbook example is the support Boeing and Airbus received for years from the American and European governments respectively, but essentially every form of state aid that is provided as part of intergovernmental competition fits this model to a greater or lesser extent.
The Boeing-Airbus analysis rests on the assumption that either firm alone could earn profits making 150-seat aircraft, but if both firms try to produce them, both will make losses (due to the inability to enjoy increasing returns to scale, sunk investment, etc. aircraft before Airbus is, the pay-offs are as indicated in Figure I and in the equilibrium, Boeing will produce the aircraft.
Figure I Two-Firm Competition
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The classic Brander-Spencer (1985) argument says that in a situation of imperfect competition as depicted in this example, governments can influence the equilibrium outcome by subsidising domestic firms. For example, the European governments can reverse this outcome by subsidising Airbus and thereby changing the payoff matrix to that represented in Figure II It is easy to see that subsidising is a dominant strategy for both governments, resulting in an equilibrium in which both firms receive subsidies that enable them to produce, ending up in a situation in which both firms actually produce. In terms of the BoeingAirbus example, both firms would have a payoff of 20. However, the respective governments provided subsidies of 25 each, implying the total change in welfare to each country is -5! The losers in this game are likely to be the consumers in both countries, as export subsidies and other forms of state aid are often financed with tax revenues.
The example illustrates the coordination problem of two countries in an industry that is relatively large. In such a circumstance the repeated plays of the competition game across time and products may assist in reaching a solution that is less punitive on the welfare of both countries: but the problem may also persist.
In some instances however, the fact that other countries are providing state aid is not a rationale for some other country to mimic that aid. Particularly, but not exclusively, where the latter country is small, by not engaging in me-too state aid it can enjoy the subsidised products of those countries that have instituted state aid.
Small countries have no bargaining power with other, larger, countries and hence no game to play in negotiation about state aid in other countries: which is another reason for them to not mimic the state-aid activities of others.
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Aside from the above analysis, a discussion of intergovernmental competition requires a general equilibrium perspective. In addition to the industry-specific inefficiencies resulting from this prisoners' dilemma type of situation in intergovernmental competition, allocative inefficiencies may arise from drawing resources from other industries or from any legitimate state aid causes.
Political Economy Rationale
Leading theoretical approaches
In addition to market failure and intergovernmental competition motives, at least some proportion of state aid is likely to be motivated by political pressure from special interest groups. Though support for this is mainly found in empirical research in the international trade policy area, 13 it should be noted that the results can also be applied to state aid as it bears many resemblances with, and can even be part of, strategic trade policy. According to some, "It is now commonplace to view trade 12 These and political economy issues for New Zealand's 1980s decisions on state aid are discussed in Evans and Richardson (2002) . 13 See, for example, Grossman and Helpman (1994) , Baldwin (1985) , and Tosini and Tower (1987) .
policy as an outgrowth of a political process that does not necessarily give rise to aggregate welfare maximization". Although the above approaches differ in focus, they all share a one-way perspective to the political influences on trade policy, i.e. they study the effects of trade policies pursued by a single country facing constant world prices. A more recent development in the political economy literature, following Putnam (1988) , is the development of two-way models that incorporate the dynamics between domestic policies and international trade policies. As state aid is a domestic policy with the strong potential to influence terms of trade, this type of analysis appears most appropriate here. Particularly, Grossman and Helpman (1995) have extended the influence-driven contributions approach to a setting with two countries that set trade policies non-cooperatively. Grossman and Helpman's (1995) two-way model is structured around a basic common agency problem, in which several principles try to induce a single agent to take a certain action. Here, the government acts as an agent for various special interest groups while being accountable for (potentially inefficient) implemented policies to the general electorate. This structure serves an appropriate political economy model to analyse the effects of state aid in a dynamic setting that captures both strategic interaction between interest groups and politicians in a domestic context and strategic interaction between governments in an international setting.
A Two-Way analysis of state aid
In the model of Grossman and Helpman (1995) , the ad valorem trade taxes or subsidies drive a wedge between domestic and offshore prices. Though state aid is not only provided through fiscal measures, the effects on prices are comparable as it affects companies' cost and price structures in much the same way as do the trade policies in Grossman and Helpman (1995) . The so-called "best response" trade (or aid) policies, incorporating the above price differences, maximise the joint welfare of each lobby and the government, when the contribution schedules of all other lobbies and the other country's trade policy are taken as given. The added value of the model is that the equilibrium policy outcomes are the sum of two components, indicated by Grossman and Helpman (1995) as the political support and terms-of-trade motives for trade intervention.
The political support component reflects a balancing of the deadweight loss associated with trade policies -that is borne by diffuse consumers -and the income gains that special interest groups can capture via such policies. This component can be illustrated as the simple case of an import tariff brought about by the lobbying of an organised import-competing industry in a small country facing fixed world prices (see Figure III) . Due to the tariff, price rises from P W , the world price, to P W+T , the world price plus the import tariff. As a result, consumer surplus is reduced by area a+b+c+d. The income gain for the import-competing producers is area a. Area c is the government's tariff revenue, and area b+d is the deadweight loss that is created by the tariff. The political support component in the model of Grossman and Helpman (1995) basically reflects a balancing of areas a and b+d, where differences in lobbying efforts lead to different policy outcomes. and a deadweight loss (hence inefficiency), and of course there is always the risk that 16 For example, the model predicts that an organised import-competing industry emerges from a trade (aid) war with a protective tariff, whereas an unorganised export industry suffers an export tax. 17 Though area c is part of the tariff revenue for the government and may be returned to consumers by way of tax relief in other areas, for example.
Home World
Quantity Quantity the exporting country will retaliate (in which case we could end up in a trade/aid war as described in section 2.2).
Figure IV
The effects of an import tariff as the result of lobbying in a large country Price S F
The effects of terms of trade on policy outcomes are reflected in a country's import demand or export supply elasticity, which is a function of that country's trade policy, the world price, and net imports. A country's market power in trade varies with the inverse of the foreign elasticity, i.e. the potential social gains from trade taxes (or other forms of state aid) become larger as foreign demand or supply becomes more inelastic (i.e. when S F in Figure IV becomes steeper, area e becomes larger), which in turn may be a reason for industries to organise themselves or increase their lobbying efforts. In the case of constant elasticities, the model of Grossman and Helpman (1995) predicts that an increasing interest of the politicians in campaign or other contributions, relative to the general interest, will raise the profits of the organised factor owners in that country at the expense of their counterparts abroad, by inducing a change in the foreign country's policy that improves the home country's terms of trade.
By accounting for the effects of lobbying efforts and the terms-of-trade changes due to trade (or aid) policies, as well as the dynamics between them, the model of Grossman and Helpman (1995) finds the following forms of aid shall be or may be considered to be compatible with the common market:
• aid having a social character, granted to individual consumers;
• aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences; • aid to promote the economic development of areas where the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment;
• aid to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest or to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State; • aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest; • aid to promote culture and heritage conservation where such aid does not affect trading conditions and competition in the Community to an extent that is contrary to the common interest;
• such other categories of aid as may be specified by a decision of the Council acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission In addition, the European Commission has adopted a number of so-called "block exemption" regulations for state aid to small and medium-sized enterprises, aid for OECD also provides a forum for discussion and coordination of national export credit policies."
It is important to note that although it is serviced by the OECD Secretariat, the Arrangement is not an OECD Rule. It is, rather, a "Gentleman's Agreement" between certain countries which are all Members of the OECD. In accordance, the participants do not form an official OECD body, though they meet under the auspices of the OECD and with support from the OECD Secretariat. The status of the Arrangement has been strikingly described as one of "useful ambiguity". The 1997 Communication specifically does not deal with the insurance of medium and long-term export-credit risks which are considered largely nonmarketable. In these areas, efforts to harmonize the terms of export-credit insurance, premiums and country-cover policy like the agreements made within the WTO and the OECD appear more appropriate. 
Trade and Aid in Services
Trade Policies in Services
WTO / GATS
The increasing importance of services led to their inclusion in the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. The central set of rules, the GATS, was to a great extent directly modelled on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and relies on many of the same principles. There are supplementary agreements -some in the form of annexes to the GATS, others embodied in Ministerial decisions -which deal with specific sectoral and other issues. In addition, each WTO member has a national schedule, which sets out commitments to not impose greater restrictions than are specified on the supply of services by other members.
Part I of the GATS (Article I) defines the scope and coverage of the GATS.
The agreement applies to measures by WTO members which affect trade in services. Members treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like services and services suppliers of any other country" 41 and to publish promptly 'all relevant measures of 39 Article I(3) of the GATS excludes "services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority". These are services that are supplied neither on a commercial basis nor in competition with other suppliers. 40 WTO (1999) . 41 According to the WTO, "a member is permitted to maintain a measure inconsistent with the general Most Favoured Nation (MFN) requirement if it has established an exception for this inconsistency. During the Uruguay Round, it became clear that unqualified liberalization in some service sectors could not be achieved, and that liberalization subject to some temporary MFN exceptions would be preferable to no liberalization at all. The result was that more than 70 WTO members made their scheduled services commitments subject to a further list of exemptions from Article II.
[…] Apart from services specified in individual MFN exemption lists, the only permitted departure from mostfavoured-nation treatment under the GATS is among countries that are members of regional trading arrangements." general application' (that is, measures other than those which involve only individual service suppliers) that affect operation of the agreement".
In addition, there are a number of specific commitments, which are described in Part III. They involve the commitment to negotiate and provide market access, as well as giving national treatment, i.e. not discriminate between domestic and foreign service suppliers. These requirements apply only to scheduled sectors. Sectors that, according to the member governments, need special treatment are air transport, financial services, telecommunications and maritime transport services.
In Part IV, Article XIX provides that WTO members will continue to hold "successive rounds of negotiations with a view to achieving a progressively higher level of liberalization" of trade in services. Finally, Part V and VI contain institutional and final provisions including dispute settlement and definitions.
During the Uruguay Round of negotiations (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) , participating countries made market-access commitments and exemptions on a number of services sectors at the same time. These commitments and exemptions are contained in their original services schedules. In addition to the services schedules, the WTO undertakes regular reviews of individual countries' trade policies to ensure transparency and stimulate adherence to the rules of the GATS. These Trade Policy Reviews review countries' general trade policy framework, as well as sectoral policies. WTO (2004b) . 43 The share of services in total employment ranged from 56% in Portugal to 76% in the Netherlands; in terms of value added, services represent between 60% (Ireland) and 80% (Luxembourg) of the total. See European Commission (2002) . 44 Some of the acceding countries (e.g. Hungary, Estonia, the Czech Republic, and the Slovak Republic) have been adjusting their industrial structures and upgrading their exports product quality, but others (such as Latvia and Lithuania) are still more labour-intensive or natural-resource-intensive.
European trade policy in services
European economic growth has generally slowed down since 2001 and this weak productivity growth has been particularly apparent in the service sector. 45 In addition, the service sector has been lagging behind other sectors in creating a single market, which, according to the WTO Trade Policy Review, is largely because of differences in regulation across member states and "red tape". One of the most important mid-and long-term goals for reforms in the European Community is to create that single market for services by further improving free movement of services between countries and (further) liberalising specific service subsectors, in order to boost the overall competitiveness of the region's economy. In particular, action plans for reform have been drawn up for financial services, telecommunications, transport, and liberalisation of the energy sector continues.
Under the GATS, the EC scheduled commitments across virtually all major service categories, though maintains so-called MFN exemptions under Article II. In parallel to the WTO work, the EC is also pursuing trade facilitation in regional and bilateral initiatives. 46 In the ongoing negotiations, the European Union does not seek to dismantle public services. No requests are being made on health services and only the United States has received a request limited to privately funded higher education.
The European Union stresses that "GATS negotiations are about opening up service trade, not about deregulating services many of which are closely regulated for very good reasons". 
New Zealand trade policy in services
The service sector is the largest sector in New Zealand, at around 68 percent of GDP in 2004. 48 The main exports are education, professional services, travel, and transport.
Currently, tourism and related services is one of the fastest growing service exports.
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State intervention appears to be minimal in most services. However, the Government owns three main electricity generators/retailers, and maintains significant state ownership in the transport sector. Sector-specific policies are in place in the telecommunications and electricity markets. 45 According to the WTO Trade Policy Review, explanations can be found in the appreciation of the euro, the fear of terrorism that followed the 11 Credit Office was established to provide assistance for insurance or guarantees to small and medium-sized exporters. In addition, the WTO's Trade Policy Review mentions that "in contrast to the 1980s and 1990s, when there was a concerted policy to reduce state ownership, the policy since 1999 has been to halt further privatisations especially of assets considered to be strategic". These measures seem to mark change
that departs from what is implied by state aid principles and rules.
Aid in Services
Services aid in the European Union
The European Union is currently the only region in which individual states are encouraged to measure and report the state aid they grant. This incentive is strengthened by the monitoring and enforcing powers of the European Commission. As indicated in Figure V , services, including tourism, financial, media and culture, received 6% of total state aid in the European Union in 2003. By far, most state aid is granted to the agriculture and manufacturing sectors. Still, 6% of roughly €86 billion amounts to more than €5 billion, which seems more than sufficient to suggest the potential of distortion in services competition. Until further specification according to aid instrument is reported (as is done for manufacturing), we can only evaluate aggregate numbers. However, statistics for individual Member States reveal that Germany and France grant more aid to services than most other European countries, both in absolute and relative terms. In terms of percentage of GDP, Portugal spends relatively most on services. When the postexpansion data become available, we will be able to see to what extent the distribution of state aid has changed after the inclusion of the new member states.
Services aid in New Zealand
In New Zealand, subsidies are granted to both public and non-public services, such as health, education, business services, broadcasting, film production, land transport, and tourism services. Most aid is provided through the various Ministries, the New Zealand Export Credit Office, and New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, the New Zealand Government's trade and economic development agency. What follows is a short outline of the aid measures in various private and semi-public service markets.
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This list is not exhaustive and it should be noted, that the aid measures discussed below do not necessarily constitute state aid of the kind that would be deemed illegal under the European law (see also section 4.3). However, they do contribute to the overview of total aid provided in New Zealand service industries. Also, there are potential other aid mechanisms at work such as state ownership of Air New Zealand.
Business services
Most of the funding to business is provided by the New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (NZTE), which is "the New Zealand Government's agency charged with helping New
Zealand businesses achieve success at home and in the global marketplace" that strives "to improve the capability and international competitiveness of New Zealand With respect to energy services (and industrial processes), the New Zealand government has been implementing Negotiated Greenhouse Gas Agreements (NGAs), which provide carbon tax reductions -in return for some management of greenhouse 
Film Production
The 
Conclusion
The amounts of aid provided for the provision of the services outlined above seem to As long as there is no requirement for governments to report the aid they grant, in whatever form, evaluation of levels and trends in state aid will have to be based on individual projects and measures that are most visible. Services are plagued with difficulties of measurement, and the effects of much state aid are hard to quantify.
Public Services
Services of General Interest
The GATS does not cover those services "supplied in the exercise of governmental authority", these being defined as services which are neither supplied on a commercial basis nor in competition with other service suppliers. 60 Examples may include certain financial services, social security, health, and education. It is typically argued that market supply for these services is often insufficient or even non-existent due to the presence of market failure. Particularly, asymmetric information and public good characteristics (i.e. limited excludability and rivalness in consumption) where they arise may cause market supply to be below the social optimum, justifying some form of government intervention. So far, this line of reasoning is similar to the market failure rationale analysed in section 2.1.1. However, more than most other goods and 60 GATS, Article 1.3(b) and 1.3(c).
services, public services serve the general interest and any financial compensation or other aid that facilitates the provision of these services should be analysed with care.
In a recent Green Paper of the European Commission (2003b), the subject matter of public services, or "services of general interest" (SGIs), is acknowledged to be complex:
"The reality of services of general interest which include services of both general economic and non-economic interest, is complex and constantly evolving. It covers a broad range of different types of activities, from certain activities in the big network industries (energy, postal services, transport, and telecommunications) to health, education and social services, of different dimensions, from European or even global to purely local, and of different natures, market or non-market."
Nevertheless, financing of public services may in some cases entail competitiondistorting state aid, which is why the European Union has published a framework paper on the matter and why other countries may want to consider similar rules.
Public service compensation in the European Union
The European Commission has recently published a Community framework paper for public service compensation. 61 As is stated in the first paragraph of the framework 1) The recipient must actually have public service obligations to discharge and those obligations must be clearly defined;
2) The parameters on the basis of which the compensation is calculated must be established in advance in an objective and transparent manner;
3) The compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of the public service obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit; and 4) Where the undertaking is not chosen in a public procurement procedure, the level of compensation must be determined by a comparison with an analysis of the costs which a typical [transport] undertaking would incur (taking into account the receipts and a reasonable profit from discharging the obligations).
Where these conditions cannot be satisfied, public service compensation will thus constitute state aid. However, the Community framework paper states that "The
Commission considers that such state aid may be declared compatible with the Treaty under Article 86(2) if it is necessary to the operation of the services of general economic interest (SGEIs) and does not affect the development of trade to such an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the Community." Article 86(2) of the EC Treaty provides that services of general interest are subject "to the rules on competition, in so far as the application of such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them". In order for
SGEIs to be compatible with the EC Treaty under Article 86(2), the following additional conditions should be met:
5) The service should be a genuine service of general economic interest within the meaning of Article 86 of the EC Treaty; and 6) there must be an instrument specifying the public service obligations and the methods of calculating compensation.
In addition, the Community framework paper states that Member States must check regularly on the absence of over-compensation -since over-compensation is not necessary for the operation of the SGEI, it constitutes incompatible state aid. benefit from competition-distorting subsidies, as it requires that any non-commercial objectives on state-owned enterprises must be addressed through an arms-length contract. 67 However, the danger of state aid provision is of course present in any stateowned company that is in direct competition with private companies. For the government not to engage in competition-distorting state aid provision, conditions 2 to 4 and 6 of the European criteria listed in the previous section are especially important. In other words, the government should make sure not to over-compensate the company, based on correct definitions, parameters, and systematic evaluation of the purposes and amount of compensation provided. As is indicated in section 2.1.2, (further) liberalisation of markets that are characterised by state-ownership should be undertaken with caution, to prevent artificial advantages for (former) state-owned firms that distort competition.
Implications for public service compensation in New Zealand
Conclusion
State aid can provide a positive contribution to the economic, and social goals that governments may have. It helps to supply those goods and services that are necessary for various economic and/or social reasons, but that are undersupplied in the market due to some form of market failure. It can also assist a country's infrastructure (broadly defined), and thereby contribute to the improvement of that country's international competitive position in trading with other countries.
Despite these reasons for the provision of state aid, there are potential inefficiencies and competition distortions that may result from it. To the extent that state aid provision creates, or has the potential to create, such inefficiencies, it should be further examined and possibly (self-)regulated. The issue is particularly important for services as these are a growing share of economic activity and trade. They are also difficult to control state aid in because the state involvement in them may be nontransparent and in some cases reflect deep political ideology.
These concerns have led to growing external monitoring and disciplines that the countries within the European Union are agreeing to have imposed on themselves.
The resultant directives led to a decrease in state aid levels. They are in line with the commitments undertaken at various European Councils, and include continued redirecting of aid towards horizontal objectives such as R&D, small and mediumsized enterprises, environment, employment and training and regional economic development. 68 New Zealand has no such external disciplines, and yet they are important for the welfare flowing from a better balance of state aid as these external disciplines act as political checks on internal excesses.
For these external disciplines to have the mentioned balancing and welfare enhancing effects, they are best organised in an international setting in which several countries commit to the state aid rules in place (as is the case in the European Union).
For New Zealand and other countries in the Asia-Pacific Region, the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum appears to be the most likely candidate that can create and maintain a system of state aid control. If this becomes a reality, the European system of state aid rules can and should function as a benchmark to use the European experience to the advantage of the Asia-Pacific countries and ensure an efficient design, commitment and enforcement process.
